Was Mike Gillis Better than Burke and Nonis?

One of the benefits to being a Canucks fan in Ottawa is the ability to follow my team from outside the Vancouver Media Bubble (VMB). The VMB, perpetuated mainly by The Province newspaper and Sportsnet Pacific, is the machine that dictates the opinions that Canuck fans are required to uphold.

I’ve followed the Canucks for 17 seasons, though the first 13 were from within the VMB. During that time, all of my opinions (unbeknownst to me) were refined by the VMB. I maintained that Vancouver was “The Goalie Graveyard”, even though the Canucks didn’t go through significantly more goalies than 80% of the other teams. I referred to the Sedins as “The Sisters” until it became unfashionable in 2006. I was excited about Luc Bourdon in 2005, then I forgot about him when he was written -off as just another draft bust three years later, then after he died I lamented on how our future stud-defenseman was taken from us too soon and vehemently denied that I had ever called him a bust. Just like everyone else.

But leaving Vancouver and breaking free from the groupthink of local fans has left me with a revelation: We’re friggin idiots devoid of long-term memory, patience, realistic assessment of our own players, or awareness of other teams.

Being outside of Vancouver for almost the entire duration of Mike Gillis’ tenure and seeing the rise and fall of the organization under his guidance without the VMB bias has left me with a much different perspective than those inside the VMB.

Which one am I supposed to hate today?

VMB Perception:

Brian Burke constructed a competitive team that was enhanced by his successor, Dave Nonis. Mike Gillis inherited the players they had acquired, idly reclined in his director’s chair, and watched the team develop into excellence while neglecting to add muscle to a skill-based team. After a few seasons, his laziness caught-up to him and the Canucks crashed, missing the playoffs.

Outside VMB Perception:

Dave Nonis inherited a team constructed by Brian Burke, stole Luongo from an insane Mike Keenan, then shuffled around draft picks and minor-leaguers until the Canucks missed the playoffs at which point Mike Gillis was hired. Gillis aggressively pursued free agents and traded draft picks and prospects for supporting players for three years until the Canucks won back-to-back President’s Trophies and came within a game of the Stanley Cup. He was awarded GM of the Year in 2011 for his efforts, but succumbed to over-conservation of assets after a bad goaltending controversy and an ineffective coaching change.

This isn’t meant to be a defense of Mike Gillis, but in all fairness, he does deserve some defense. Let’s give an honest assessment of Gillis compared to Burke and Nonis:

Drafting:

Brian Burke: Bryan Allen (4^th Overall); Jarkko Ruutu (68^th Overall); Daniel Sedin (2^nd Overall); Henrik Sedin (3^rd Overall); Nathan Smith (23^rd Overall); RJ Umberger (16^th Overall); Kevin Bieksa (151^st Overall); Ryan Kesler (23^rd Overall);

Dave Nonis: Cory Schneider (26^th Overall); Alex Edler (91^st Overall); Jannik Hansen (287^th Overall); Luc Bourdon (10^th Overall); Mason Raymond (51^st Overall); Michael Grabner (14^th Overall); Patrick White (25^th Overall);

Mike Gillis: Cody Hodgson (10^th Overall); Jordan Schroeder (22^nd Overall); Nicklas Jensen (29^th Overall); Frank Corrado (150^th Overall); Brendan Gaunce (26^th Overall); Bo Horvat (9^th Overall); Hunter Shinkaruk (24^th Overall);

Burke's Best Draft Trade

 Burke drafted marginally well. Bryan Allen (4^th overall) was a mild bust, but the 1998 draft was very hit-or-miss, so Burke could have done much worse. Obviously winning the Sedins (2^nd & 3^rd overall) makes him seem like the heavy favourite, but that had more to do with his shrewd trading ability to acquire the 2^nd and 3^rd overall picks. Nathan Smith (23^rd overall) was a bust, and RJ Umberger (16^th overall) was a decent selection who was later traded away for a rental player. In 2003, Burke drafted Ryan Kesler (23^rd overall). On one hand, you can make the argument that the 2003 first round was so talent-laden that Burke could’ve thrown a dart and still ended up with Mike Richards or Corey Perry. On the other hand, he was under pressure to draft the local boy, Jeff Tambellini. His only late-round success was Kevin Bieksa (151^st overall).

I couldn't find Cory Schneider's Draft-Day photo. So here's some guy.

In four years, Nonis’ first round selections were Cory Schneider (26^th overall), Luc Bourdon (10^th overall), Michael Grabner (14^th overall), and Patrick White (25^th overall). What’s notable about all four selections is that they required years to develop. Grabner and Schneider didn’t become full-time NHLers until they were 23 and 24, respectively. Patrick White never developed. Luc Bourdon passed on before reaching his potential, but based on where he was at age 21, he realistically would have topped-out as a decent third-pairing defenseman. However, Nonis did manage to find some diamonds in the rough with Alex Edler (91^st overall), Jannik Hansen (287^th overall) and Mason Raymond (51^st overall).

I couldn't find Cory Schneider's Trade-Day photo, so here's Bo.

In six seasons, Gillis only had two draft picks higher than 22^nd. One was Cody Hodgson (10^th overall) and the other was Bo Horvat (9^th overall). Similar to how Burke was under pressure to draft Tambellini, Gillis was under pressure to draft Kelowna’s Kyle Beach over Hodgson. Regardless of how disappointed you are with the Hodgson-for-Kassian trade, Kassian remains miles ahead of Beach. As for Horvat, Brendan Gaunce, and Hunter Shinkaruk, we’ll have to wait until at least 2015-2017 to properly cross-compare them to Nonis’ draft picks. So far, Gillis’ only the late-round selection to develop has been Frank Corrado (150^th overall).

Verdict:

I give this one to Nonis as he drafted five full-time NHLers in four years. Burke only drafted seven in six years (even with three top-5 overall picks). Gillis’ picks haven’t developed yet, but so far he has only two in six seasons.

Trading:

Brian Burke:

One of Burke’s first challenges as GM was dealing with the Pavel Bure situation (wow, that was a long time ago). The trade was a win for the Panthers, but Burke pulled a decent package in return, including Ed Jovanovski. His second challenge was finding a goalie, and that didn’t go so well. Kevin Weekes was part of the Bure package, and was later re-packaged for Felix Potvin who didn’t work out either. The best he could do was acquire Dan Cloutier for Adrian Aucoin and a 2^nd round pick and then Alex Auld for a couple more picks. Cloutier was actually an above-average goaltender during the regular season, but his legacy was overshadowed by an inability to replicate his success in the playoffs.

His playoff save percentage is right behind Corey Hirsch and Troy Gamble.

His crowning achievement was negotiating the trade that brought both Sedins to Vancouver, though flipping an inconsequential draft pick for Trevor Linden carried emotional significance. His last good trade was Peter Schaefer for Sami Salo, then he spent two years shuffling around draft picks and minor players. His most significant acquisition in that timespan was Marek Malik, just to give an idea as to how much he had stopped trying.

The greatest tragedy is that he played the majority of his career pre-shootout. 

Dave Nonis:

Let’s get this out of the way early: Nonis completely robbed the Florida Panthers of Roberto Luongo. The trade was so obviously lopsided that Mike Keenan was fired as Panthers GM immediately afterwards. However, Nonis’ inability to negotiate even one other marginally advantageous trade suggests that the Luongo deal was just a final ‘screw-you’ to the Panthers ownership from Keenan. In four years, Nonis’ second-best trade was a mid-round pick for Taylor Pyatt. Sure, he managed to get a 2^nd round draft pick for Brent Sopel, but he would later trade that pick ALONG WITH a 4^th round pick for…Brent Sopel. He literally threw away a 4^th round pick just to put Brent Sopel on another team for six months. And just for some salt in the wound, that 2^nd round pick turned out to be Wayne Simmonds.

Brent Sopel: So ugly that Dave Nonis gave up Wayne Simmonds just to get rid of him for six months.

Mike Gillis:

On the negative, Gillis never made any outstanding trades. His best trade was two nobodies for Christian Ehrhoff, but that was mostly just a salary dump for San Jose. On the positive, Gillis was very good at finding rental players. Burke threw away RJ Umberger for Martin Rucinsky and then later a 2^nd round pick for Drake Berehowsky. Nonis’ best trade-deadline move was losing a 2^nd round pick for Bryan Smolinski. But Gillis was able to find useful players at the trade deadline like Chris Higgins and Maxim Lapierre, and they only cost a 3^rd round pick and a minor leaguer each.

Verdict:

All three GMs did little-to-nothing towards the end of their respective tenures. Burke wins the Best Trade Award for the Sedins, Nonis wins the Biggest Steal Award for Luongo, and Gillis deserves credit for bringing in Higgins and Lapierre at the deadline, but looking over their entire rap sheet, I’d give it to Burke, with Gillis as runner-up, though none of these GMs was particularly strong.

Signings:

Brian Burke:

In six seasons, Burke only signed four free-agents who played more than a handful of games. Those four: Murray Baron, Harry York, Andrew Cassels, and Magnus Arvedson. They combined for 8 points in 30 playoff games.

Erik Karlsson recently passed him for 2nd on all-time scoring for the Ottawa Senators among Swedes.

Dave Nonis:

He signed Willie Mitchell, a feat which singlehandedly beats Burke. But he didn’t do much beyond that. His other notable signings include Jan Bulis (the namesake of the Pass it to Bulis blog), Rory Fitzpatrick (who was almost jokingly voted into an all-star game), Jeff "Bra-Barian" Cowan, and Curtis "Sandman" Sanford (Luongo’s longest-serving backup). In short, Nonis signed a lot of players who are famous for something other than being good hockey players.

Looking back, we were probably pretty bored.

Mike Gillis:

This is where Gillis shined. As a former player agent, he was seen as a GM who could attract talent in the free-agent market where Burke and Nonis failed. And that view, initially at least, turned out to be accurate. In only his first two seasons, Gillis would sign free agents who would go on to play more games with the organization than every single free agent signed by Burke and Nonis combined. Those signings include Dan Hamhuis, Manny Malhotra, Raffi Torres, Mikael Samuelsson, Tanner Glass, Pavol Demitra, Chris Tanev, and Darcy Hordichuk. Even omitting his offer sheet to David Backes, or his success in landing Mats Sundin, Gillis is the clear winner here. Unfortunately, his only notable signing in his final four years was Jason Garrison.

Watching Sundin score the shootout-winning goal against the Leafs made every penny of his contract worth it.

Verdict:

No GM owns a category like Gillis owns free agency.

Goalie Controversy

The biggest knock against Gillis was his handling of the goaltender controversy. Here’s how that came about:

1. He had a franchise goalie.
2. He signed the franchise goalie to a franchise contract.
3. A second franchise goalie developed within the organization.

You’re in that situation. What do you do?

1. Trade your franchise goalie and keep the young goalie, or
2. Trade your young goalie and keep the franchise goalie?

You choose (1):

Other GMs are aware that you’re desperate to move one of your goalies. They point-out that they would also be required to take on a massive contract, and that goalies have not fetched a high return on the trade market for the past 10 years. You do not receive any good trade offers.

You choose (2):

Other GMs are sceptical of your asking price for a young goalie who has not played much at the NHL level. You must either trade the goalie for very little, or else play him at your franchise goalie’s expense to give him NHL exposure and boost his trade value.

Obviously, Gillis’ only choice was B, and that’s what caused the “goalie controversy” despite there being no personal hostility between Luongo and Schneider. The “controversy” was completely manufactured by the VMB. Look around the NHL at other teams who have two good goalies: Anaheim, St. Louis, Los Angeles. Do these teams have “goalie controversies”? No, they just have two good goalies, and they play in a hockey market where the media isn’t going to pretend that it’s anything more than that.

Final Word:

And now Jim Benning is the team’s GM. Here’s a question: Why is it that when Mike Gillis trades away Roberto Luongo for a bottom six player and a goaltending prospect, he’s a moron, but when Jim Benning trades away Jason Garrison with a pick and prospect for a bottom six player, he’s a shrewd businessman looking to shed salary while getting rid of a player who wasn’t fitting into the organization? Sure, he saved some cap space, but then he spent it on Ryan Miller who hasn’t been good in 4 years, and has recently posted similar stats to young up-and-comer Eddie Lack! Based on the trajectories of their careers, Lack should be the better goalie by next year. So why are we giving 18 million dollars to a guy who may soon be our second-best goalie?!

It was time for Gillis to go. But we’re soon going to realize that we took him for granted.