Blue Teams Keep on Losing

If you were to go to the nearest person and ask to play one round of Rock, Paper, Scissors, how likely would you be to win that round? 1 in 3, or 33.3%, right?

Granted, there are Jedi mind-tricks available to improve your odds, but in theory at least, your chances of winning are 33.33%. That leaves you with a 66.67% chance that you'll either lose or draw. 

Assuming that both you and your opponent are making your selections randomly, what is the likelihood that you will fail to win if you play two rounds? The answer is (2/3)² or 44.36%. The likelihood of failing to win if you play three rounds is (2/3)³  or 29.54%.

Obviously, the more rounds that you play, the less likely you are to continue losing. It would be ludicrous to suggest that you could play 20 rounds without winning once. The odds of that are (2/3)²⁰ or 0.03% or 1 in 3325. 

Of course it's possible that you are just extremely unlucky. But if you were to play 20 rounds of Rock, Paper, Scissors and not win a single round, you'd probably suspect that something was awry. Either your opponent was a mind-reader or you were somehow giving away your move. Only a dunce would believe that it was a fluke. 

Let that scenario sink-in and hold it in your mind while we talk about something different in the next few paragraphs.

From 1926 until the end of the Original-6 era, the only blue teams were the Maple Leafs and the Rangers (unless you count the one season that the St. Louis Eagles existed). By the mid-70s, half of the league wore blue, and today, 11/30 teams wear primarily blue. Since 1926 (the first year the Stanley Cup was awarded exclusively to the NHL champions), about 36% of teams have worn blue. You can name a random NHL franchise, and it's more probable than not that at least one of their uniforms since 1996 has been predominantly blue. And that's not even counting the Avalanche and Penguins who have worn blue alternate jerseys in recent years. My point: blue has been the de-facto colour amongst hockey teams for decades now. 

By the way, this unofficial NHL Uniforms website was an invaluable resource for this study.

If team colour had no bearing on success, we should expect to see a blue-coloured team win a Stanley Cup every 2 or 3 seasons. Even in an 88-year period (1927-2015), the odds of the NHL going 20 consecutive years without one of them winning would be 110:1.

We need to talk about this.

The NHL has a reputation as a copycat league, but this is a trend that nobody seems to be taking seriously or even noticing. Despite the Stanley Cup being persistently hoisted by red and/or black teams, while lifelong-blue teams such as the Maple Leafs, Blues, and Rangers possess notorious Stanley Cup droughts, blue continues to be as popular a colour as ever.

Admittedly, the Oilers and Islanders had dynasties back in the 1980s, and the Maple Leafs had some success in the 40s and 60s, but those all occurred before the age of parity. Since the introduction of the salary cap, those three teams have combined for five post-season appearances in 10 years. In a league where teams are no longer able to hoard superstars, the little things matter. Is jersey colour one of those things? Are blue teams at a psychological disadvantage?

This is a problem worth addressing for three reasons:

1. It makes sense. A common objection to my claim is that correlation doesn't imply causation - it could simply be a coincidence, or else perhaps blue is an unoriginal colour that is selected by management teams who make unoriginal decisions that thus result in inferior teams.
   
   Fortunately, I have multiple scientific studies on my side that support the idea that team colour has a causal relationship with team performance. A German study on soccer teams suggests that red teams score 10% more. This UK medical publication finds that competitors in red have higher testosterone levels. The Journal of Sports Sciences associates red shirt colour with long-term success. The Association for Psychological Science published an in-depth study on the 2004 Olympics that discovered that athletes wearing red substantially outperformed athletes wearing blue, particularly in aggressive sports. Jerald Kralik at Dartmouth University attributes this phenomenon to our primal urge to avoid the colour red as we subconsciously associate it with pain, danger, and intense emotion.
2. Nobody else is talking about it. I feel like I'm the only one who notices that blue teams always disappoint in the playoffs. Since 2006, there have been 21 occasions where a higher-seeded blue team was upset by a lower-seeded red/black team in the playoffs. Conversely, there have only been 9 occasions where a lower-seeded blue team upset a higher-seeded red/black team. I'm starting to feel guilty about how much I've profited from betting against blue teams.
3. There's a simple fix. If my team loses because the other team is better, then I can begrudgingly accept that. If my team always loses because they're at a psychological disadvantage that can be remedied with a new shirt colour, then call a f*****g marketing meeting and change the shirt colour, damn it!

Before I continue, let me address some issues:

Q: What do I mean by "primary/major/base" colour?

A: I mean the colour that comprises more than 50% of the surface area of a team's home (non-white) jersey. This doesn't take into account alternate jerseys.

Q: What colour are the Avalanche?

A: They're burgundy, which is a shade of dark red. Thus, they fall under the "red" banner. 

Q: What colour are the Sharks?

A: They're "Pacific Teal" which is a greenish shade of blue.

Q: How about the Wild?

A: They wore green with red alternate jerseys until 2007. Then they switched to red with green alternate jerseys. I categorize them under "green" until 2007, and "red" ever since.

Q: How many teams have worn something other than blue, red, black, or green?

A: Only four. The Flyers have worn orange through most of their history, except for the last decade when they mostly wore black. The Pittsburgh Pirates also wore orange back when they existed in the 1920s. The Kings have had an on-again, off-again relationship with purple (don't ask - it's complicated). And the Predators have worn gold for the past four seasons. Interestingly, every single team in the league wore either red, blue or black between 2007 and 2010.

So there you go. In a league in which a team can wear any colour they want, over 90% choose one of the same three colours, one of which isn't technically a colour. 

But even black is at an all-time low in popularity right now. Only Anaheim, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles currently wear predominantly black uniforms, and they've all won a Stanley Cup in just the last 8 years. 2015 was the first year since 2006 where at least one of the Stanley Cup finalists wasn't wearing black. Add in the Chicago Blackhawks (see what I did there), and you've got the last 7 Stanley Cups.  In a copycat league, why is nobody copying that?

Maybe I'm just bitter as a Canucks fan. The Canucks originally wore blue, but never managed to win a single playoff series until after they switched to black - most notably in 1982. 

Photo Credit: canucks.nhl.com

Those jerseys were reportedly designed by a colour psychologist. When they first came out, critics scoffed at the idea that the team would play better, only to watch them run to the Stanley Cup Finals with only the 11th-best regular season record. 12 years later, still wearing black, they made another Stanley Cup Final appearance with only the 14th-best regular season record. They were within one goal of defeating Mark Messier and the theoretically-much-better New York Rangers (who were wearing blue).

The Vancouver teams wearing black jerseys never seemed particularly good on paper, but they often exceeded expectations in the playoffs. In their last three seasons wearing black, the Canucks won 4 playoff series as a lower-seeded underdog. Since returning to blue in 1997, they have never won a playoff series as a lower-seed. Not once. They have, however, lost to a lower-seeded team wearing either red or black on six occasions, most recently the Calgary Flames this year. I'm tired of cheering for a team that, at best, meets expectations but never exceeds them.

So I ask, why? Why do so many teams adhere to a colour that was universally considered "delicate and dainty" as recently as the 1920s? 

The answer may come from this study published by the University of British Columbia which suggests that blue is considered to be a psychologically "safe" colour which instills feelings of relaxation and creativity. Blue teams, therefore, perform better in games/sports that emphasize strategy over physicality, such as baseball. But red triggers feelings of urgency, focus, and quick decision making. Thus, you have a situation where the less-popular colour results in superior in-game performance. 

Only the Blues and Blue Jackets really need to wear blue. The Canucks logo is an orca - orcas are not blue. Neither are sharks, lightning bolts, or maple leaves. Even the Sabres, Rangers, Islanders, and Jets can be whatever colour they want to be. 

There's a whole spectrum of colours out there, and yet only a handful of teams have ever tried anything outside of blue, red, or black. Two of them are clearly superior to the third, so those teams who choose to wear an inferior colour need to either innovate or adapt.

Was Mike Gillis Better than Burke and Nonis?

One of the benefits to being a Canucks fan in Ottawa is the ability to follow my team from outside the Vancouver Media Bubble (VMB). The VMB, perpetuated mainly by The Province newspaper and Sportsnet Pacific, is the machine that dictates the opinions that Canuck fans are required to uphold.

I’ve followed the Canucks for 17 seasons, though the first 13 were from within the VMB. During that time, all of my opinions (unbeknownst to me) were refined by the VMB. I maintained that Vancouver was “The Goalie Graveyard”, even though the Canucks didn’t go through significantly more goalies than 80% of the other teams. I referred to the Sedins as “The Sisters” until it became unfashionable in 2006. I was excited about Luc Bourdon in 2005, then I forgot about him when he was written -off as just another draft bust three years later, then after he died I lamented on how our future stud-defenseman was taken from us too soon and vehemently denied that I had ever called him a bust. Just like everyone else.

But leaving Vancouver and breaking free from the groupthink of local fans has left me with a revelation: We’re friggin idiots devoid of long-term memory, patience, realistic assessment of our own players, or awareness of other teams.

Being outside of Vancouver for almost the entire duration of Mike Gillis’ tenure and seeing the rise and fall of the organization under his guidance without the VMB bias has left me with a much different perspective than those inside the VMB.

Which one am I supposed to hate today?

VMB Perception:

Brian Burke constructed a competitive team that was enhanced by his successor, Dave Nonis. Mike Gillis inherited the players they had acquired, idly reclined in his director’s chair, and watched the team develop into excellence while neglecting to add muscle to a skill-based team. After a few seasons, his laziness caught-up to him and the Canucks crashed, missing the playoffs.

Outside VMB Perception:

Dave Nonis inherited a team constructed by Brian Burke, stole Luongo from an insane Mike Keenan, then shuffled around draft picks and minor-leaguers until the Canucks missed the playoffs at which point Mike Gillis was hired. Gillis aggressively pursued free agents and traded draft picks and prospects for supporting players for three years until the Canucks won back-to-back President’s Trophies and came within a game of the Stanley Cup. He was awarded GM of the Year in 2011 for his efforts, but succumbed to over-conservation of assets after a bad goaltending controversy and an ineffective coaching change.

This isn’t meant to be a defense of Mike Gillis, but in all fairness, he does deserve some defense. Let’s give an honest assessment of Gillis compared to Burke and Nonis:

Drafting:

Brian Burke: Bryan Allen (4^th Overall); Jarkko Ruutu (68^th Overall); Daniel Sedin (2^nd Overall); Henrik Sedin (3^rd Overall); Nathan Smith (23^rd Overall); RJ Umberger (16^th Overall); Kevin Bieksa (151^st Overall); Ryan Kesler (23^rd Overall);

Dave Nonis: Cory Schneider (26^th Overall); Alex Edler (91^st Overall); Jannik Hansen (287^th Overall); Luc Bourdon (10^th Overall); Mason Raymond (51^st Overall); Michael Grabner (14^th Overall); Patrick White (25^th Overall);

Mike Gillis: Cody Hodgson (10^th Overall); Jordan Schroeder (22^nd Overall); Nicklas Jensen (29^th Overall); Frank Corrado (150^th Overall); Brendan Gaunce (26^th Overall); Bo Horvat (9^th Overall); Hunter Shinkaruk (24^th Overall);

Burke's Best Draft Trade

 Burke drafted marginally well. Bryan Allen (4^th overall) was a mild bust, but the 1998 draft was very hit-or-miss, so Burke could have done much worse. Obviously winning the Sedins (2^nd & 3^rd overall) makes him seem like the heavy favourite, but that had more to do with his shrewd trading ability to acquire the 2^nd and 3^rd overall picks. Nathan Smith (23^rd overall) was a bust, and RJ Umberger (16^th overall) was a decent selection who was later traded away for a rental player. In 2003, Burke drafted Ryan Kesler (23^rd overall). On one hand, you can make the argument that the 2003 first round was so talent-laden that Burke could’ve thrown a dart and still ended up with Mike Richards or Corey Perry. On the other hand, he was under pressure to draft the local boy, Jeff Tambellini. His only late-round success was Kevin Bieksa (151^st overall).

I couldn't find Cory Schneider's Draft-Day photo. So here's some guy.

In four years, Nonis’ first round selections were Cory Schneider (26^th overall), Luc Bourdon (10^th overall), Michael Grabner (14^th overall), and Patrick White (25^th overall). What’s notable about all four selections is that they required years to develop. Grabner and Schneider didn’t become full-time NHLers until they were 23 and 24, respectively. Patrick White never developed. Luc Bourdon passed on before reaching his potential, but based on where he was at age 21, he realistically would have topped-out as a decent third-pairing defenseman. However, Nonis did manage to find some diamonds in the rough with Alex Edler (91^st overall), Jannik Hansen (287^th overall) and Mason Raymond (51^st overall).

I couldn't find Cory Schneider's Trade-Day photo, so here's Bo.

In six seasons, Gillis only had two draft picks higher than 22^nd. One was Cody Hodgson (10^th overall) and the other was Bo Horvat (9^th overall). Similar to how Burke was under pressure to draft Tambellini, Gillis was under pressure to draft Kelowna’s Kyle Beach over Hodgson. Regardless of how disappointed you are with the Hodgson-for-Kassian trade, Kassian remains miles ahead of Beach. As for Horvat, Brendan Gaunce, and Hunter Shinkaruk, we’ll have to wait until at least 2015-2017 to properly cross-compare them to Nonis’ draft picks. So far, Gillis’ only the late-round selection to develop has been Frank Corrado (150^th overall).

Verdict:

I give this one to Nonis as he drafted five full-time NHLers in four years. Burke only drafted seven in six years (even with three top-5 overall picks). Gillis’ picks haven’t developed yet, but so far he has only two in six seasons.

Trading:

Brian Burke:

One of Burke’s first challenges as GM was dealing with the Pavel Bure situation (wow, that was a long time ago). The trade was a win for the Panthers, but Burke pulled a decent package in return, including Ed Jovanovski. His second challenge was finding a goalie, and that didn’t go so well. Kevin Weekes was part of the Bure package, and was later re-packaged for Felix Potvin who didn’t work out either. The best he could do was acquire Dan Cloutier for Adrian Aucoin and a 2^nd round pick and then Alex Auld for a couple more picks. Cloutier was actually an above-average goaltender during the regular season, but his legacy was overshadowed by an inability to replicate his success in the playoffs.

His playoff save percentage is right behind Corey Hirsch and Troy Gamble.

His crowning achievement was negotiating the trade that brought both Sedins to Vancouver, though flipping an inconsequential draft pick for Trevor Linden carried emotional significance. His last good trade was Peter Schaefer for Sami Salo, then he spent two years shuffling around draft picks and minor players. His most significant acquisition in that timespan was Marek Malik, just to give an idea as to how much he had stopped trying.

The greatest tragedy is that he played the majority of his career pre-shootout. 

Dave Nonis:

Let’s get this out of the way early: Nonis completely robbed the Florida Panthers of Roberto Luongo. The trade was so obviously lopsided that Mike Keenan was fired as Panthers GM immediately afterwards. However, Nonis’ inability to negotiate even one other marginally advantageous trade suggests that the Luongo deal was just a final ‘screw-you’ to the Panthers ownership from Keenan. In four years, Nonis’ second-best trade was a mid-round pick for Taylor Pyatt. Sure, he managed to get a 2^nd round draft pick for Brent Sopel, but he would later trade that pick ALONG WITH a 4^th round pick for…Brent Sopel. He literally threw away a 4^th round pick just to put Brent Sopel on another team for six months. And just for some salt in the wound, that 2^nd round pick turned out to be Wayne Simmonds.

Brent Sopel: So ugly that Dave Nonis gave up Wayne Simmonds just to get rid of him for six months.

Mike Gillis:

On the negative, Gillis never made any outstanding trades. His best trade was two nobodies for Christian Ehrhoff, but that was mostly just a salary dump for San Jose. On the positive, Gillis was very good at finding rental players. Burke threw away RJ Umberger for Martin Rucinsky and then later a 2^nd round pick for Drake Berehowsky. Nonis’ best trade-deadline move was losing a 2^nd round pick for Bryan Smolinski. But Gillis was able to find useful players at the trade deadline like Chris Higgins and Maxim Lapierre, and they only cost a 3^rd round pick and a minor leaguer each.

Verdict:

All three GMs did little-to-nothing towards the end of their respective tenures. Burke wins the Best Trade Award for the Sedins, Nonis wins the Biggest Steal Award for Luongo, and Gillis deserves credit for bringing in Higgins and Lapierre at the deadline, but looking over their entire rap sheet, I’d give it to Burke, with Gillis as runner-up, though none of these GMs was particularly strong.

Signings:

Brian Burke:

In six seasons, Burke only signed four free-agents who played more than a handful of games. Those four: Murray Baron, Harry York, Andrew Cassels, and Magnus Arvedson. They combined for 8 points in 30 playoff games.

Erik Karlsson recently passed him for 2nd on all-time scoring for the Ottawa Senators among Swedes.

Dave Nonis:

He signed Willie Mitchell, a feat which singlehandedly beats Burke. But he didn’t do much beyond that. His other notable signings include Jan Bulis (the namesake of the Pass it to Bulis blog), Rory Fitzpatrick (who was almost jokingly voted into an all-star game), Jeff "Bra-Barian" Cowan, and Curtis "Sandman" Sanford (Luongo’s longest-serving backup). In short, Nonis signed a lot of players who are famous for something other than being good hockey players.

Looking back, we were probably pretty bored.

Mike Gillis:

This is where Gillis shined. As a former player agent, he was seen as a GM who could attract talent in the free-agent market where Burke and Nonis failed. And that view, initially at least, turned out to be accurate. In only his first two seasons, Gillis would sign free agents who would go on to play more games with the organization than every single free agent signed by Burke and Nonis combined. Those signings include Dan Hamhuis, Manny Malhotra, Raffi Torres, Mikael Samuelsson, Tanner Glass, Pavol Demitra, Chris Tanev, and Darcy Hordichuk. Even omitting his offer sheet to David Backes, or his success in landing Mats Sundin, Gillis is the clear winner here. Unfortunately, his only notable signing in his final four years was Jason Garrison.

Watching Sundin score the shootout-winning goal against the Leafs made every penny of his contract worth it.

Verdict:

No GM owns a category like Gillis owns free agency.

Goalie Controversy

The biggest knock against Gillis was his handling of the goaltender controversy. Here’s how that came about:

1. He had a franchise goalie.
2. He signed the franchise goalie to a franchise contract.
3. A second franchise goalie developed within the organization.

You’re in that situation. What do you do?

1. Trade your franchise goalie and keep the young goalie, or
2. Trade your young goalie and keep the franchise goalie?

You choose (1):

Other GMs are aware that you’re desperate to move one of your goalies. They point-out that they would also be required to take on a massive contract, and that goalies have not fetched a high return on the trade market for the past 10 years. You do not receive any good trade offers.

You choose (2):

Other GMs are sceptical of your asking price for a young goalie who has not played much at the NHL level. You must either trade the goalie for very little, or else play him at your franchise goalie’s expense to give him NHL exposure and boost his trade value.

Obviously, Gillis’ only choice was B, and that’s what caused the “goalie controversy” despite there being no personal hostility between Luongo and Schneider. The “controversy” was completely manufactured by the VMB. Look around the NHL at other teams who have two good goalies: Anaheim, St. Louis, Los Angeles. Do these teams have “goalie controversies”? No, they just have two good goalies, and they play in a hockey market where the media isn’t going to pretend that it’s anything more than that.

Final Word:

And now Jim Benning is the team’s GM. Here’s a question: Why is it that when Mike Gillis trades away Roberto Luongo for a bottom six player and a goaltending prospect, he’s a moron, but when Jim Benning trades away Jason Garrison with a pick and prospect for a bottom six player, he’s a shrewd businessman looking to shed salary while getting rid of a player who wasn’t fitting into the organization? Sure, he saved some cap space, but then he spent it on Ryan Miller who hasn’t been good in 4 years, and has recently posted similar stats to young up-and-comer Eddie Lack! Based on the trajectories of their careers, Lack should be the better goalie by next year. So why are we giving 18 million dollars to a guy who may soon be our second-best goalie?!

It was time for Gillis to go. But we’re soon going to realize that we took him for granted. 

Sham Sharron is a Sham

If you haven't heard, there's an article going around Canuck Land about the uselessness of Ron Delorme and his scouting staff. If you haven’t read it at Canucks Army, I’ll give you the breakdown:

Ron Delorme, the Canuck’s Chief of Amateur Scouting, is so bad at his job that any nitwit with access to basic statistics could make better draft selections. By simply selecting the CHL’s highest-scoring forward available, the team could have drafted Justin Williams instead of Nathan Smith, P.A. Parenteau rather than Konstantin Mikhailov, Matt Stajan over Kirill Koltsov, and Claude Giroux (!) over Michael Grabner.

Ultimately, the article summarizes, the Canucks have missed out on almost 1000 extra goals in over 4000 extra man games (and counting) by relying on Ron Delorme’s scouting staff (and unnecessarily paying their salaries).

Frequent readers of my blog will know that I relish finding simple formulas that outperform raw intuition. In fact, both of them shared the article on my Facebook wall.

Needless to say, other Canuck fans are deliriously giddy over this newfound gem, practically begging to hand-deliver the news to Jim Benning’s front door. And initially, so was I. But then I discovered a problem.

It’s bullshit.

And even though I love a simple formula that outperforms intuition, it doesn’t apply when the formula is bullshit.

Oh sure, it may look airtight to the amateur armchair GM. But when you look below the surface, you'll see that you need to predict the future in order to make use out of the method. Like any poor indicator, it uses information that would not be available to the GM at the time of the draft pick. And any method that relies on not-yet-available information is only effective in 20/20 hindsight.

If you believe that the Sham Sharron method is simply picking the next-available CHL forward who scored the most points in his draft-eligible year, then you failed to read the fine print. 

Here’s how the method actually works:

1. Look at a given Canucks draft-pick, and all of the players chosen after that draft-pick, but before their next draft-pick.
   
2. Only look at the CHL forwards.
   
3. Select the player with the highest-scoring draft year FROM AMONG THOSE WHO WERE SELECTED BEFORE THEIR NEXT PICK.
   

So in the above illustration, it looks pretty simple. Of the 15 forwards who were drafted between 24^th and 60^th, Mike Richards was the highest scoring forward. Sham would therefore select him. Except that there’s one easily overlooked problem: When Sham goes to make his selection, the draft board looks like this:

Sham, the uneducated intern, has no idea who the other teams are going to select before his next pick. For all he knows, any one of those teams might select Corey Locke (who led the CHL in scoring with 151 points). 

Would you draft this guy over Ryan Kesler?

Unless Sham has a crystal ball, he has no idea that Locke will go unselected until the 113^th pick. At this point in the draft, an uneducated moron like Sham might believe that Locke has a good chance of being selected in the near future. Following his formula, he should therefore draft Locke over Mike Richards (or Ryan Kesler, Corey Perry, Shea Weber, or Patrice Bergeron). Corey Locke, in case you’ve never heard of him, would play a grand total of 9 NHL games, assisting on a single goal by Nick Foligno during a stint with the Senators. For those keeping track, that’s 645 games, 391 points, and one Selke Trophy fewer than Delorme’s preference - Ryan Kesler. Suddenly, the New York Rangers aren’t the only team that busted in the 2003 first round.

Hugh Jessiman, better known by his nickname, "Oops".

If you’re curious as to Sham’s 1^st round picks in every other year:

On the surface, it may not seem like Sham does too poorly in comparison with the Canucks’ actual picks. Although he scores only half the points, he does so without any salary and still picking the better player almost half of the time.

But when you look below the surface, you realize something terrible: Not only is Sham completely neglecting defense and goaltending, but all of his forwards are one-dimensional scorers! Ryan Kesler ALONE is more valuable than every one of Sham’s picks COMBINED!

And let’s not forget that the article conveniently applies Sham’s method beginning in 2000 as opposed to one year earlier. What would Sham have done if he had been hired in 1999?

I’m no Ron Delorme fan, but he's at least worth a positive number.

---EDIT---

After I posted this, it was brought to my attention that the Sham Sharron method chooses players based on their scoring numbers at age 17 which isn't necessarily the year that they're draft eligible. I humbly re-did some calculations, and discovered ANOTHER problem: SHAM FUDGED SOME NUMBERS!

Justin Williams, for example, may have scored 83 points in his draft eligible season, but he was 18 years old at the time. He was born in October 1981, so he would have turned 17 at the start of the 1998-99 season in which he scored a measly 12 points in 47 games. Nathan Smith, by comparison, scored 49 points at 17-years-old and 90 points at 18-years-old.